



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
LUFKIN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

§  
§  
§  
§  
§

v.

CASE NO. 9:14-CR-13(2)

FREDERICK L. MITCHELL

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON GUILTY PLEA  
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

By order of the District Court, this matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for administration of a guilty plea and allocution under Rules 11 and 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Magistrate judges have the statutory authority to conduct a felony guilty plea proceeding as an “additional duty” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). *United States v. Bolivar-Munoz*, 313 F.3d 253, 255 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002), *cert. denied*, 123 S. Ct. 1642 (2003). On January 7, 2015, this cause came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for entry of a guilty plea by the defendant, Frederick Mitchell, on **Count One and Count Two** of the charging **Information**<sup>1</sup> filed in

---

<sup>1</sup>The defendant executed a Waiver of Indictment which was filed in the record of this case at the guilty plea hearing.

this cause.

Count One of the Information charges that from on or about October of 2012, the exact date being unknown to the Grand Jury, and continuing thereafter until July 22, 2014, in the Eastern District of Texas and elsewhere, Frederick Mitchell, defendant, knowingly and intentionally conspired and agreed together with other persons known and unknown, to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance, namely, a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.

Count Two of the Information alleges that on or about July 6, 2014, in the Eastern District of Texas and elsewhere, Frederick Mitchell, defendant, traveled in interstate commerce from the State of Wisconsin to the State of Texas, with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, and facilitate the promotion, management, establishment and carrying on of an unlawful activity, that is, a conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, and thereafter performed and attempted to perform an act to promote, manage, establish, and carry on, and to facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, and carrying on of such unlawful activity, that is, the transportation of approximately \$253,341 in U.S. Currency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3) and 2.

Defendant, Frederick Mitchell, entered a plea of guilty to Count One and Count Two of the Information into the record at the hearing.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 the Court finds:

- a. That Defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the guilty plea in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Texas subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.
- b. That Defendant and the Government have entered into a plea agreement which was disclosed and addressed in open court, entered into the record, and placed under seal.
- c. That Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, and that the plea of guilty is a knowing, voluntary and freely made plea. Upon addressing the Defendant personally in open court, the Court determines that Defendant's plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats or promises. *See* FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
- d. That Defendant's knowing, voluntary and freely made plea is supported by an independent factual basis establishing each of the essential elements of the offenses and Defendant realizes that his conduct falls within the definition of the crimes charged under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3) and 2.

**STATEMENT OF REASONS**

As factual support for Defendant's guilty plea, the Government presented a factual

basis. *See Factual Basis and Stipulation.* In support, the Government and Defendant stipulated that if this case were to proceed to trial the Government would prove beyond a reasonable doubt, through the sworn testimony of witnesses, including expert witnesses, as well as through admissible exhibits, each and every essential element of the crimes charged in Count One and Count Two of the Information. The Government would also prove that the defendant is one and the same person charged in the Information and that the events described in the Information occurred in the Eastern District of Texas and elsewhere. The Court incorporates the proffer of evidence described in detail in the factual basis and stipulation in support of the guilty plea.

Defendant, Frederick Mitchell, agreed with and stipulated to the evidence presented in the factual basis. Counsel for Defendant and the Government attested to Defendant's competency and capability to enter an informed plea of guilty. The Defendant agreed with the evidence presented by the Government and personally testified that he was entering his guilty plea knowingly, freely and voluntarily.

**RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION**

**IT IS THEREFORE** the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the District Court accept the Guilty Plea of Defendant which the undersigned determines to be supported by an independent factual basis establishing each of the essential elements of the offenses charged in **Count One and Count Two** of the charging **Information** on file in this criminal proceeding. The Court also recommends

that the District Court accept the plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c). Accordingly, it is further recommended that, Defendant, **Frederick Mitchell**, be finally adjudged as guilty of the charged offenses under **Title 21, United States Code, Section 846 and Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1952(a)(3) and 2**.


Defendant is ordered to report to the United States Probation Department for the preparation of a presentence report. At the plea hearing, the Court admonished the Defendant that the District Court may reject the plea and that the District Court can decline to sentence Defendant in accordance with the plea agreement, the federal sentencing guidelines and/or the presentence report because the sentencing guidelines are advisory in nature. The District Court may defer its decision to accept or reject the plea agreement until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report. *See* FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3). If the Court rejects the plea agreement, the Court will advise Defendant in open court that it is not bound by the plea agreement and Defendant may have the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea, dependent upon the type of the plea agreement. *See* FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(B). If the plea agreement is rejected and Defendant still persists in the guilty plea, the disposition of the case may be less favorable to Defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement. Defendant has the right to allocute before the District Court before imposition of sentence.

### **OBJECTIONS**

Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party's failure to object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to *de novo* review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, *see Rodriguez v. Bowen*, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, *see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (en banc). The constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *United States v. Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

**SIGNED this the 9th day of January, 2015.**



KEITH F. GIBLIN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE